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NOTES
INTERMITTENT AND CONSTANT COMMON SITUS PICKETING
In 1947 Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act by
inserting, along with other provisions, section 8(b) (4) (A).' Under
this section it is an unfair labor practice for a union to encourage em-
ployees to strike, if one of the objectives is to force any employer
to cease doing business with any other person. Congressional debates2
indicate that the purpose of this provision is to prohibit "secondary
boycotts."' The 1947 amendments, however, do not use the terms
"primary" and "secondary." Rather, the prohibition against secondary
activity in 8(b) (4) (A) was sought to be achieved through a formula
of proscribed activity and proscribed objectives including the forcing
of an interruption of trade relations. Although boycott originally meant
a concerted withdrawal of all intercourse,4 the objective here proscribed
is the unilateral suspension of trading with another. What is "secon-
dary" depends upon the viewpoint of the observer. A refusal by one
employer, R2, to deal with R1, is primary from his viewpoint, but it
might be considered a secondary pressure from the viewpoint of other
employers, R3, R4, . . . if they, for example, were fair trading competi-
tors of R1, a price-cutter, and R2 was the common supplier. For the
purposes of this paper, R1 will be identified as an employer from whom
concessions are sought with respect to conditions of work or recognition
of bargaining representative. R2 is an employer or self-employed per-
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (4) (A), 61 Stat.
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(A) (1958).
Sec. 8 . . .
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents- . . .
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employ-
ment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or
work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform
any services where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any
employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organi-
zation or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person.
2. Senator Taft stated that 8(b) (4) was aimed at secondary not primary action.
"This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business
of a third person who is unconcerned in the disagreement between the employer and his
employees. . . ." 93 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947).
3. For a history of secondary boycotts see: Lloyd & Wescel, Public Policy and
Secondary Boycotts, 23 U. CINc. L. RFv. 31 (1954).
4. II ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 662 (1930).
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son other than an ultimate consumer from whom concessions are sought
with respect to his dealings with R1, unless the employer or self-employed
person is identified with R1, as an "ally."'  Pressure against R2 is to
be described as secondary, because its purpose is to elicit pressure for
concessions from Ri, described as primary.
To distinguish primary from secondary pressure in the form of
picketing may be difficult. In the classic primary picketing situation
the union will exert pressure against R1 by picketing the premises
immediately adjacent to the business of Ri. The premises immediately
adjacent to the business of R1 are commonly known as the "situs of
the dispute." Thus, when the union pickets the situs of the dispute
and R1 is the only one located thereon, this picketing is clearly protected
by the National Labor Relations Act as primary since the object of the
union is to exert pressure on R1.h
In the classic case of secondary picketing pressure the union seeking
concessions from R1, might induce E2 (the employees of R2) to get
R2 to cease doing business with R1, and this inducement might take
the form of enlisting pickets at the premises of R2 or the same form
of inducement might manifest itself in a plan to appeal directly to R2
on behalf of El to cease doing business with R1, without involving E2.
In either of these two situations the picketing takes place not at the situs
of the dispute, but rather at the premises of 112, and is considered secon-
dary. The Board and courts, then, are able to determine the union's
objectives under 8(b) (4) (A) by seeing where the picketing takes
place. If confined to the situs of the dispute, where RI is located, it
is primary; but if extended to the premises of R2, thus exerting pressure
on R2, it is secondary.
A third situation might be imagined, however, where both R1 and
R2 occupy the same premises. In this case the fact that the picketing
is limited to the situs of the dispute is not helpful in ascertaining the
union's purpose in picketing. Those cases where R1 and R2 occupy the
same premises are termed common situs cases. This common situs situation
5. When an employer allies himself with R1 he is no longer a secondary employer
and thus not under the provision of (8) (b) (4) (A). The doctrine was started in
NLRB v. Business Mach. Mechanics Conference Bd., 228 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1955),
Cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956), where the court said: ". . . [A]n employer is not
within the protection of § 8(b) (4) (A) when he knowingly does work which would
otherwise be done by the striking employees of the primary employer and where this
work is paid for by the primary employer pursuant to an arrangement devised and
originated by him to enable him to meet his contractual obligations. The result must
be the same whether or not the primary makes any direct arrangement with the employers
providing the services."
6. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 13, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 163 (1958).
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may occur in one of two ways. First, Rl's normal business operations
may take him onto the premises of R2; or, secondly, R2's business may
take him onto the premises of Ri, for a constant and extended period
of time. This second situation is to be differentiated from the situation
where pickets are stationed at the premises of Ri, but pressure is felt
by R2 employees seeking entry to those premises.7 This is not a common
situs situation since R2's employees enter the premises only sporadically
and for a short period of time. This is really a case of primary picketing
as mentioned in the first instance since there is no common situs and
the picketing is confined to the situs of the dispute.
When Rl's normal business operations do take him onto the
premises of R2 and picketing occurs, the descriptive term applied
by the Board and courts is ambulatory or roving situs picketing, and
when R2's business takes him onto the premises of R1 regularly and for
a constant period and picketing occurs, it is known as stationary common
situs picketing. Another term which could be used to describe the
former type of activity would be intermittent situs picketing since the
picketing only takes place when R1 is on the premises of R2. More
descriptive, perhaps, to describe the latter condition is constant situs
picketing. That is, the picketing is constant at the situs of the dispute
and the real question arises when R2 enters onto the premises of R1.
It will be the focal point of this discussion to see how the Board and
courts determine the union's objectives in these situations. First, it
is necessary to discuss how the problem was viewed before 1959; and,
secondly, what is the effect of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.8
In order to gain insight into the pre-19 59 cases it seems that the
best breakdown would be to discuss, first, roving or intermittent situs
picketing cases; and secondly, the constant or stationary common situs
7. In NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co. 341 U.S. 665 (1951) the pickets
were stationed at the situs of the dispute, but the pressure of picketing was felt by
individual members of E2 seeking entry onto the premises of R1. E2 were employees
sent by R2 to merely pick up certain materials, and except for these sporadic individual
entrances on the premises of RI the employees of R2 could not be termed to have a
common working situs with Ri. In this case the Court, under the existing version of
8(b) (4), did not reach the question of whether the pressure of members on E2 was
secondary, rather the holding was on the ground that this was not concerted action
by E2. Had the question been reached the results should have been that this was not
secondary activity. Since it was confined to the situs of the dispute and was not a
common situs situation, it was primary picketing. Thus, the Rice Milling case is in
reality not a common situs picketing situation at all. Not all courts have made this
distinction, however, and some have applied Rice Milling to the common situs situation.
8. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin)
73 Stat. 519-41 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-531 (Supp. 1959).
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picketing. Although these are both facets of the same problem the
courts have approached them in a different manner.
In intermittent picketing situations the "land-mark" decision in
this whole area is the Moore Dry Dock case.' In this case the S. S.
Propho, a ship belonging to Samsoc put into dry dock for repairs. The
Sailor's Union of the Pacific had a dispute with Samsoc, who had no
dock in California which the seamen could picket. When the Moore
Dry Dock Company refused to allow the union to enter the premises
and picket alongside the ship, the union picketed Moore's premises. In
finding this picket line lawful the Board laid down definite conditions
that must be met, as they were here, before the union's objectives would
be considered lawful. The Board said:
• . . [P]icketing of the premises of a secondary employer is
primary if it meets the following conditions: (a) The picket-
ing is strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute
is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) At the
time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its
normal business at the situs; (c) The picketing is limited to
places reasonably close to the location of the situs; and (d)
The picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the
primary employer."0
A short time later, almost as a corollary to these rules, the court held
in the Washington Coca Cola case" that a "fifth" condition was necessary
to the four already set forth in Moore Dry Dock. In the Washington
Coca Cola case the union, after calling a strike for recognition against
the Coca Cola Bottling Works, picketed not only the plant but the
company's delivery trucks at the premises of its customers. The NLRB
held that the picketing of the trucks violated 8(b) (4) (A), distinguishing
the Moore Dry Dock line of cases largely on the ground that in the
present case the primary employer had a permanent place of business
which the union could and did picket. This ruling has developed into
the Washington Coca Cola doctrine. The substance of this rule has
been expressed by the Board as follows:
Where a primary employer has a permanent place of business
at which a union can adequately publicize its labor dispute,
. . . the fact that picketing is conducted at the premises of a
9. Sailors' Union, AFL, 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
10. Id. at 549.
11. Brewery Drivers, AFL, 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953), enforcement granted, 220
F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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secondary employer plainly reveals that it was designed, at
least in part, to induce and encourage the employees of the
secondary employer to engage in a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment, to handle goods for the primary
employer, with an object of forcing the secondary employer
to discontinue doing business with the primary employer,
thereby violating 8(b) (4) (A) of the act.
Thus, unless there is external conformity with these five conditions
the Board will impute an unlawful objective to the union's picketing.
However, the Board has consistently held that when these five conditions
are met, the picketing is lawful.' What the Board has attempted to
do in these cases is to lay down certain definite standards that will
enable a union to know exactly what it must do in roving situs situations
that will insure them the protection of lawful picketing.
Certain courts of appeal, unlike the Board, have not been as prone
to limit themselves to viewing only whether these five conditions have
been fulfilled. In the Campbell Coal Company case,14 for example, a
union, which had a dispute with a ready-mix concrete manufacturer,
picketed a manufacturer's plants. It also picketed the company's trucks
as they made deliveries to construction projects where secondary con-
tractors were working, thus causing employees of these secondary em-
ployers to cease work. Relying exclusively on the Washington Coca
Cola doctrine the NLRB found a violation of 8(b) (4) (A). The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit disagreed.'5 Although admitting they had
affirmed the Washington Coca Cola case, the court stated they agreed
only to the decision which the Board reached, which rested in considerable
part upon additional findings. The court did not agree with the rule
relied on by the Board in the Campbell case.1 The court agreed that
the factual basis of the rule is a factor to consider in determining whether
a violation had occurred, but it also held that this was not conclusive.
Thus, the federal courts are divided as to the validity of the "fifth
condition." Some seem to support it;1 others, although willing to
12. Local 386, Teamsters Union, 120 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1958).
13. The latest Board cases which require the five conditions to be met are: Local
294, Teamsters Union, 124 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1959); Local 522, Teamsters Union, 45
L.R.R.M. 1313 (1960); Teamsters Union, 45 L.R.R.M. 1328 (1960).
14. Sales Drivers Union, AFL, 110 N.L.R.B. 2192 (1954).
15. Sales Drivers Union v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 972 (1956).
16. Id. at 516.
17. NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters Union, 272 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1959) ; NLRB v.
General Drivers Union, 251 F.2d 494 (6th Cir. 1958) ; NLRB v. United Steel Workers,
AFL-CIO, 250 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1957).
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accept its factual basis as evidence to support a finding based on the
entire record, do not accept the Board's doctrine as conclusive."8 What
then is the status of roving situs picketing? In writing the opinion
in the Campbell case the court quotes with approval from the Massey
case."9 From this it would seem that in the Fifth and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits the "fifth" condition of Washington Coca Cola may or
may not be of value in determining the lawfulness of a strike. Both of
these courts hold that a secondary strike must be intentionally sought
after, and not merely follow as an incidental result of primary activity,
before there is a violation of 8(b) (4) (A). The "fifth" condition of
Washington Coca Cola cannot be read into the statute by implication
and depending on the circumstances may or may not serve as an
evidentiary test. With the exception of the Fifth and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits, however, the courts and Board have attempted to set
down certain definite, concrete rules that, when met, will impute to
the union a lawful objective; and when not complied with will impute
to the union an unlawful objective. The District of Columbia and Fifth
Circuits, on the other hand, will look at all the surrounding evidence to
see if the union's purpose is one proscribed by 8(b) (4) (A).
Turning now to the constant situs cases (where R2's business
takes him onto the premises of R1 regularly and for a constant period)
the Board and courts have dealt with this situation in a different manner.
For a time after the Moore Dry Dock case the Board and courts
made no distinction between constant and intermittent situs picketing.
Rather they applied the Moore Dry-Dock rules in any common situs
situation. This may be seen in the Hoosier Petroleum case."0 In this
case R1, a truck owner-lessor, maintained a regular place of business
at the premises of R2, a service station operator. The employees of RI
picketed the service station in a manner contrary to the standards set
up in the Board's Moore Dry Dock decision, and the Board thus held
that this was a violation of 8(b) (4) (A). In this decision the court
found that the requirement for picketing R1 was the same whether Rl's
business had a common situs with that of R2 or was ambulatory as in
18. Sales Drivers Union v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 972 (1956); Truck Drivers and Helpers v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir.
1957) ; NLRB v. General Drivers, 225 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1955).
19. NLRB v. General Drivers, 225 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
914 (1955).
20. Chauffeurs Union, 106 N.L.R.B. 629 (1953), emforced, 212 F.2d 216 (7th
Cir. 1954).
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the earlier Moore Dry Dock case.2
Until 1957 the Board and courts were consistent in applying the
Moore Dry Dock rules to all common situs situations. In that year,
however, the Retail Fruit Dealers case,22 did not, in fact, follow the
rules of Moore Dry Dock. In this case R1, owner of a general market
housing sixty-four retail shops, became involved in a bargaining dispute
with the union. All but four shops in the market were leased to other
retailers, and the union's dispute with R1 involved only one of the four
shops operated by him. Nevertheless, the union placed pickets at the
seven street entrances to the market, expressly declining on invitation
to enter the market and picket only those specific shops involved in the
dispute. Although the placards displayed by the pickets indicated the
retailers with whom the union had a dispute, employees of R2 in the
market refused to cross the line. The picketing was held to be illegal.
The Board's opinion first stated that if the Moore Dry Dock standards
were fulfilled the picketing would be lawful, and in this respect the
Board was consistent with the prior cases. The Board then added,
however, that the "controlling consideration" in developing the condi-
tions laid down in Moore Dry Dock had been "to require that the picket-
ing be so conducted as to minimize its impact on neutral employees insofar
as this could be done without substantial impairment of the effectiveness
of the picketing in reaching primary employees. 23
Thus, simply because the unions meet the requirements of Moore
Dry Dock is not enough; the union must now make a "bona fide" effort
to minimize the harmful effects of picketing on the operations of R2.
As the Board said: "In view of all the foregoing circumstances, we are
satisfied that Local 648 did not make any bona fide effort to minimize
the impact of its picketing upon the the operations of the neutral em-
ployees in the market....
In order for the Board to determine if there had been a "bona fide
effort" it would look at all the surrounding evidence in order to ascer-
tain the legality of the picketing, and would not limit itself to seeing only
if the four rules of Moore Dry Dock were met. As the dissent in
Retail Fruit Dealers correctly pointed out, the requirements of Moore
Dry Dock had been satisfied; but even though they were fulfilled this
21. In Local 55, Carpenters, AFL, 108 N.L.R.B. 363 (1953), the Board pointed out
that the fact the picketing takes place at the situs of the primary employer's regular
place of business rather than the ambulatory situs is not controlling.
22. Retail Fruit Clerk's Union, 116 N.L.R.B. 856 (1956), enforced, 249 F.2d 591
(9th Cir. 1957).
23. Id. at 859.
24. Id. at 862.
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was not enough, because the Board had adopted a new standard in the
constant situs cases-the "bona fide effort" rule.25
Although the majority in Retail Fruit Dealers did start out with
the premise that Moore Dry Dock was applicable, the concurring opinion
stated that the issue was not whether the requirements of Moore Dry
Dock had been fulfilled but instead that the standard to be applied by
the Board should be whether all the evidence showed that the picketing
was for a proscribed object.26  On appeal the Ninth Circuit granted
enforcement" of the Board's order which condemned the picketing as
illegal. Although supporting the majority approach of the Board and
seeming to approve the application of the Moore Dry Dock rules to this
case, the court went on to say that upon all the evidence "the Board
could properly infer that an object of the picketing was to involve neu-
trals in the dispute, which is a violation of 8(b) (4) (A)."2
In adopting the "bona fide effort" test as the controlling standard
in constant situs cases the Board moved away from the approach based
on the external physical criteria of Moore Dry Dock and entered an
area of using all the various evidence to determine the union's purpose
in picketing.
In the Incorporated Oil case2 9 the "bona fide effort" rule was fully
recognized by the Board, and in this case the Board found no need to
ascertain whether the rules of Moore Dry Dock had been complied with,
but instead only looked to the "bona fide effort" test as set forth in the
Retail Fruit Dealers case. Again in Incorporated Oil the dissent cor-
rectly points out that the Board was ignoring precedent by failing to
apply the Moore Dry Dock rules, and now had, in fact, adopted the
position first set forth by the concurring opinion in the Retail Fruit
25. The dissenting opinion in Retail Fruit Clerk's Union, 116 N.L.R.B. 856, 871
(1956), said: "Indeed, . . . the majority obviously does not rely upon the above
standards of Moore Dry Dock in finding that the picketing in this case violated Section
8(b) (4) (A). Rather it adopts a new criterion, ignoring the well-established andjudicially approved standards of the Moore Dry Dock case. The new test, announced
here for the first time in order to find conduct otherwise lawful to be unlawful, is a
broad generalization that the picketing union must make a 'bona fide effort to minimize
the impact of its picketing upon the operations of the neutral employees.' No specific
standards are now afforded a union to guide its activities in picketing the premises
occupied by two employees. Whatever a picketing union does it does at the peril of
finding that this Board will regard it as evidence of bad faith and for that reason
forbids all of the picketing."
26. The concurring opinion in Retail Fruit Clerk's Union, 116 N.L.R.B. 856, 865
(1956), stated: "We are not required to decide whether picketing of the general entrance
of a market like the Crystal Palace : . . is per se a violation of 8(b) (4) (A). I believe
instead, that the only issue is whether the picketing was for a proscribed object ..
27. Retail Fruit Clerk's Union v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957).
28. Id. at 598.
29. Local 618, Automotive Union, AFL-CIO, 116 N.L.R.B. 1844 (1956).
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Dealers case. On appeal the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement."0 Al-
though the court agreed to the application of the "bona fide effort"
rule, it differed, however, on the ground that the evidentiary support
for the Board's conclusion was lacking. 1
The "bona fide effort" test is the new approach of the Board in
constant situs cases. This new approach has found favor with the
courts, for in two recent cases the court has adopted the "bona fide
effort" criteria in constant situs cases." The District of Columbia
Circuit in the Seafarer's Union case clearly adopted this new approach.
In this case the union, seeking recognition as bargaining agent of the
crew of the Jl/V Pelican, formed a picket line at an independently owned
shipyard where the vessel was undergoing repair. The picketing con-
tinued even after the employer removed the remaining crew members.
Despite clear indications that the only dispute was with the vessel's
operator, the shipyard's employees refused to service the ship although
they continued their other work. The NLRB held, one member dissent-
ing, that continued picketing after removal of the employees was an
unfair practice on the ground that an object of the picketing was to induce
the shipyard employees to cease work on the Pelican.3 3 But on appeal
the Board's order was set aside on the ground that the Board erred in
its ruling because an employer cannot, by mere removal of employees,
change legal picketing into illegal picketing. Although the Board's
order was set aside, the court did agree that the prime determinent of
legality is the objective of the union pressure. In a Fifth Circuit case34
the court, although disagreeing with other aspects of the Seafarer's
holding, did agree that the determinent of the lawfulness of constant situs
picketing was a question of intent. The court said further that this
intent is not something that may be evaluated mechanically.
A new variation of constant situs picketing has emerged recently
in what might be called "the special door doctrine." In a recent case, 35
which illustrates this doctrine, the union representing General Electric's
employees called a strike against General Electric and began to picket
the plant. At this plant not only were General Electric personnel em-
ployed but other employees of independent contractors as well worked
30. 249 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1957).
31. Id. at 336.
32. Seafarer's Int'l. Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Superior
Derrick Corp. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1960).
33. Seafarer's Int'l. Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 1638 (1958).
34. Superior Derrick Corp. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1960).
35. Local 761, IUE v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 364
U.S. 869 (1960) (No. 321, 1960 Term).
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within the plant. While picketing was in progress, the General Electric
Company set aside one gate for the special use of the independent con-
tractors' employees to enter and leave the plant, but expressly provided
that none of General Electric's employees would be allowed to use this
special gate. The union refused to stop picketing at this gate, however
and in an unfair practice proceeding the NLRB held that the union
violated 8(b) (4) (A) by inducing and encouraging the employees of
an independent contractor to engage in a work stoppage with an object
of forcing the independent contractor to cease doing business with
General Electric." Although this is an interesting variation this is still
the constant situs problem; and the court, in agreeing with the Board,
held that in any of these constant situs situations "the ultimate finding
of whether the picketing is lawful turns on a determination of what are
the union's objectives."" Here, by picketing this special door, it was
found that the union's objectives were unlawful.
In summarizing the present position on constant situs picketing it
may be seen that from the Moore Dry Dock decision until 1957 the Board
and courts applied the Moore Dry Dock rules to all common situs situa-
tions. After the Retail Fruit Dealers case, however, the "bona fide effort"
rule replaced the Moore Dry Dock standards in constant situs cases.
Thus, from 1957 until the present the Board and courts have attempted
to determine the lawfulness of constant situs picketing by merely asking,
"Do the union's objectives include one prohibited by 8(b) (4) (A)"?
To determine the objective they have looked to all the evidentiary facts
present. This shows that the Board and courts in constant situs cases
'do not use mechanical rules in judging the union's objectives, but merely
will view all the evidence and then determine if the union has complied
with the "bona fide effort" test. This has not been the case, as was
pointed out above, in respect to intermittent or roving situs cases. In the
Board's approach, and in a majority of the circuits, the violation of
8(b) (4) (A) is to be determined in the roving situs case, by viewing
the four rules laid down in Moore Dry Dock plus the "fifth" condition
in the Washington Coca Cola case. If these criteria are met then no
matter what other evidentiary facts are present a lawful objective will be
imputed to the union, and if these five conditions are not met an unlawful
objective will be imputed to the union. Because of this difference in
approach it is necessary to distinguish ambulatory picketing from station-
ary common situs picketing to point up how in the latter area the "bona
36. Local 761, IUE, 123 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1959).
37. Local 761, IUE v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 282, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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fide effort" test has emerged and seemed to predominate. The question
remains whether the Board will adopt the same criteria in the roving
or intermittent situs cases. So far it has not. By using all the evidence
available in order to see if the union has complied with the "bona fide
effort" rule, the Board and courts will do away with a strictly mechanical
approach and allow the courts to take notice of all the facts in determining
the "object" of the union's picketing. But resorting to the "bona fide
effort" test as the criterion to determine the legality of picketing is resort-
ing to no criterion at all, and it may become increasingly difficult for
unions engaged in a strike at a common situs to determine what may be
done without the Board formulating definite rules for guidance.
This was the development until 1959 when 8 (b) (4) of the National
Labor Relations Act was amended by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959." Under this new act (8) (b) (4) begins
with operative language describing the kinds of union action prohibited
if "an object" is one of the purposes set forth in clauses (A), (B), (C)
or (D). It should be noted that the secondary boycott provision formerly
found in 8(b) (4) (A) will now be found in 8(b) (4) (B). From the
standpoint of viewing common situs picketing cases, however, the most
important change came as the result of the proviso at the end of clause
(B). This new proviso was apparently added to make sure that "primary
picketing," having incidental secondary effects of inducing employees of
secondary employers to refuse in the course of their employment to enter
the establishment of the primary employer, is not prohibited solely because
of such incidental effect. The use of the term "primary" for the first
38. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Grif fin)
§ 8(b) (4) (A) and (B), 73 Stat. 542-43, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. 1959).
Sec. 8 . . .
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents...
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce, or in an
industry affecting commerce, or in either case an object thereof is: (A)
forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any
labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is pro-
hibited by section 8(e) ; (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize
or bargain with a labor organization as the representatives of his employees
unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of section 9: Provided, that nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful where
not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing . .. ."
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time in the act should not cause any real confusion, because the Board and
courts have generally used the term primary when referring to lawful
activity under 8 (b) (4) (A) and secondary when referring to a proscribed
activity. Thus, the courts and Board have, in fact, been using this label
all the time.
In examining the legislative history39 it seems that the draftsman did
not intend to change the pre-existing limitations on common situs picket-
ing, but, in fact, intended that they remain the same as they were under
Taft-Hartley. As was stated in the Conference Report regarding the
enactment of the proviso in 8(b) (4) (B) :
The purpose of this provision is to make it clear that the changes
in 8(b) (4) do not overrule or qualify the present rules of law
permitting picketing at the site of the primary labor dispute.
This provision does not eliminate, restrict, or modify the limita-
tions on picketing at the site of the primary labor dispute that
are in existing law. See, for example . . . Moore Dry Dock
Co .. ; Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc..
It may be seen that the legislature did not intend to change the effect of
the "secondary boycott" section, as regards common situs picketing; but
it may be speculated that the court could in fact do so by merely saying
that all picketing is primary if conducted at the site of the labor dispute.
If the court then labels such picketing primary they could exempt all
common situs picketing even though there are intended secondary effects.
This would, of course, do away with the whole concept of common situs
picketing; and would clearly be contrary to the legislative history.The legislative history does not refer specifically to constant or
roving situs cases, but rather reference is only made to the whole area of
common situs picketing. Thus, it may be surmized, the intention of the
legislature is that the same standards should be applied to common situs
cases by the Board and courts under the 1959 amendment as they applied
under Taft-Hartley.
Although it seems fairly clear that the legislature intended no change
in the standards applied to common situs picketing still a change might
occur under the new amendments. What could happen is that the two
circuits that presently do not follow the Washington Coca Cola standard
in the roving situs situation might now be compelled to follow it. The
reason they might, perhaps, now feel obliged to change their position is
the fact that the Conference Report specifically states that "this provision
39. See Conference Report No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959).
40. Ibid.
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does not eliminate . . . or modify the limitations on picketing at the site
of a primary labor dispute that are now in existing law" and then cites
Moore Dry Dock and Washington Coca Cola as examples. Perhaps the
District of Columbia and Fifth Circuits will now feel compelled to adopt
the reasoning of these cases as the legislative will of Congress. In sum-
mary, it seems fairly clear that the pre-19 5 9 Board and court decisions
regarding common situs picketing will continue to be the controlling
precedent under the new Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
RECOGNITION OF GAIN ON THE SALE OF REALTY-
THE CLOSED TRANSACTION TEST
When a taxpayer sells real property and receives the full consider-
ation in the same taxable year, there is, of course, no doubt as to when
his gain or loss will be recognized for federal income tax purposes. This
is true whether the taxpayer uses the cash or accrual method of reporting
his income.' However, where the receipt of the consideration by the
seller is extended over more than one taxable year by periodic deferred
payments, and the sale does not qualify for, or the taxpayer does not
elect, 2 the special treatment under the installment method,' the cases
appear conflicting and confused as to when the gain should be reported.
The confusion arises mainly in the case of an individual, cash-basis tax-
payer who sells his home or other real property under a simple land
contract. He may be forced to recognize his total gain for income tax
purposes before it has been actually realized.
There is no express statutory authority for the use of a deferred-
1. Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950). In general, when a taxpayer is on
the cash basis, his taxable income is the aggregate of income items actually or construc-
tively received during the taxable year in cash or its equivalent. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-
1(c) (1) (i), 1.451-1 (a). Under the accrual method, income must be reported when all
the events have occurred which fix the right to receive income and the amount can be
ascertained with reasonable accuracy. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446(c) (2) ; Treas.
Reg. 88 1.446-1 (c) (ii), 1.451-1 (a).
2. The installment method is optional. Joseph Frost, 37 B.T.A. 190 (1938), acq.,
1938-2 Cum. BuLL. 13; G.C.M. 3350, VII-1 Cum. BuLL. 62 (1928).
3. Under the installment method, if the payments received in the year of sale do
not exceed 30 per cent of the selling price, the taxpayer may report only that proportion
of his gain on the installment payments actually received during the taxable year which
the total gross profit to be realized bears to the total contract price, thereby spreading
his gain over the life of the contract. INT. REv. CoDE op 1954, § 453.
